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Ethics of modifying the mitochondrial genome
A L Bredenoord,1 W Dondorp,2 G Pennings,3 G De Wert2
ABSTRACT
Recent preclinical studies have shown the feasibility of
specific variants of nuclear transfer to prevent
mitochondrial DNA disorders. Nuclear transfer could be
a valuable reproductive option for carriers of
mitochondrial mutations. A clinical application of
nuclear transfer, however, would entail germ-line
modification, more specifically a germ-line modification
of the mitochondrial genome. One of the most
prominent objections against germ-line modification is
the fear that it would become possible to alter
‘essential characteristics’ of a future person, thereby
possibly violating the child’s right to an open future. As
only the nuclear DNA would contain the ingredients for
individual characteristics, modification of the mtDNA is
often considered less controversial than modification of
the nuclear DNA. This paper discusses the tenability
of this dichotomy. After having clarified the concept of
germ-line modification, it argues that modification of
the mtDNA is not substantively different from
modification of the nuclear DNA in terms of its effects
on the identity of the future person. Subsequently the
paper assesses how this conclusion affects the moral
evaluation of nuclear transfer to prevent mtDNA
disorders. It concludes that the moral acceptability of
germ-line modification does not depend on whether it
alters the identity of the future childdall germ-line
modifications dodbut on whether it safeguards the
child’s right to an open future. If nuclear transfer to
prevent mtDNA disorders becomes safe and effective,
then dismissing it because it involves germ-line
modification is unjustified.
As there is no curative treatment, helping carriers of
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) mutations to have
healthy genetically related children has been
a central focus of attention. MtDNA disorders are
usually severe disorders, caused by defects in energy
production. Patients show a wide variety of
symptoms but generally the most energy-
demanding tissues such as the central nervous
system, heart and skeletal muscles, liver and kidney
are affected.1 One future reproductive option to
prevent the transmission of an mtDNA mutation
from mother to child could be nuclear transfer (or
‘mitochondrial gene replacement’). Nuclear transfer
involves the transfer of the nuclear DNA of
a woman carrying an mtDNA mutation into an
enucleated donor oocyte. This should result in
healthy offspring carrying the mtDNA of the
oocyte donor and the nuclear genome of the
prospective parents. Nuclear transplantation can be
performed before and after in-vitro fertilisation,
using the nucleus of an unfertilised oocyte, the
pronuclei of the zygote or the nucleus of a blasto-
mere of an embryo.2e4 Nuclear transfer does not
entail genetic selection of an embryo or fetus; it is
a type of genetic intervention or modiﬁcation
whereby the mtDNA (which exists outside the
nucleus, in the cytoplasm) is changed or replaced
with the aim of correcting the genetic cause of the
disease.5
Recent studies have shown that speciﬁc variants
of nuclear transfer are feasible in non-human
primates and in human oocytes. In a non-human
primate model, researchers in Oregon transferred
the spindleechromosomal complex of a mature
oocyte to an enucleated donor oocyte, resulting in
three thus far healthy macaque infants.6 In the
UK, researchers used abnormally fertilised human
oocytes left over after in-vitro fertilisation treat-
ment and transferred the pronuclei of a zygote to
an enucleated donor oocyte.7 As a result of these
technical successes, it seems only a matter of time
before a ﬁrst-in-human clinical application is
considered. All existing reproductive options for
carriers of mtDNA mutations have their limita-
tions.8 9 Nuclear transfer may therefore be a valu-
able additional option. As having healthy,
genetically related children is for many people one
of the most important desires in life, helping
couples to fulﬁl this desire is a legitimate aim of
a reproductive technique such as nuclear transfer
for mtDNA disease. A clinical application,
however, would entail germ-line modiﬁcation,
more speciﬁcally a germ-line modiﬁcation of the
mitochondrial genome. Germ-line modiﬁcation is
highly controversial, as the prohibition by inter-
national declarations, such as the Council of
Europe Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine10 gives evidence of. One of the most
prominent (non-safety) objections against germ-
line modiﬁcation is the fear that it would become
possible to alter ‘essential characteristics’ of
a future person, thereby possibly violatingdwhat
Feinberg in another context coineddthe child’s
right to an open future.11 As only the nuclear DNA
would contain the ingredients for our characteris-
tics, modiﬁcation of the nuclear genome has led to
more ethical controversy than modiﬁcation of the
mitochondrial genome. In this paper, we discuss
the tenability of this dichotomy. After having
clariﬁed the concept of germ-line modiﬁcation, we
discuss whether modiﬁcation of the mitochondrial
genome has the potential to affect the identity or
‘essential characteristics’ of the future person, and
if so, how this affects the moral evaluation. By
focusing on the issue of identity, we will leave
aside other potential objections against nuclear
transfer to prevent mtDNA disorders, such as
safety issues, the moral evaluation of ‘three genetic
parents’ and the creation and destruction of
human embryos. For a review we refer the reader
to Bredenoord et al.5
1Department of Health, Ethics
and Society, Maastricht
University/Julius Center,
University Medical Center,
Utrecht, The Netherlands
2Department of Health, Ethics
and Society, Research Institutes
GROW and CAPHRI, Maastricht
University, Maastricht, The
Netherlands
3Ghent University, Bioethics
Institute Ghent, Ghent, Belgium
Correspondence to
Dr Annelien L Bredenoord, Julius
Center for Health Sciences and
Primary Care, University Medical
Center Utrecht, Stratenum,
6.131, PO Box 85500, 3508 GA
Utrecht, The Netherlands;
a.l.bredenoord@umcutrecht.nl
Received 29 April 2010
Revised 13 September 2010
Accepted 25 September 2010
Published Online First
11 November 2010
J Med Ethics 2011;37:97e100. doi:10.1136/jme.2010.037481 97
Genetics
 group.bmj.com on January 21, 2011 - Published by jme.bmj.comDownloaded from 
GERM-LINE MODIFICATION
We use the term germ-line modiﬁcation to refer to any
biomedical intervention that modiﬁes the genome that a person
can transmit to his or her child and the child’s entire lineage.12 13
Not all genetic modiﬁcations affect the germ line, but genetic
modiﬁcations in the still pluripotent cells of the early embryo
do. Not surprisingly, the concept is usually taken as referring to
germ-line modiﬁcations of the nuclear genome, ie, the DNA
present in the nucleus of each cell. After all, this comprises
99.9% of the total amount of DNA (approximately 24 000
genes). However, each cell also contains a second genome,
located in the mitochondria. These are tiny organelles in the
cytoplasm surrounding the nucleus; they serve as the ‘power-
houses’ of the cell. The mitochondrial genome is extremely
small, containing approximately 0.1% of the total amount of
DNA (37 genes). The relevant genes are all involved in the cell’s
energy metabolism, whereas the nuclear DNA has a much wider
range of functions. Transmission is also different. Unlike the
nuclear genome, the mtDNA is only transmitted maternally and
in a less predictable (non-Mendelian) way. However, these
differences (limited quantity, speciﬁc function, maternal and
non-Mendelian transmission) do not change the fact that
modiﬁcations of the mitochondrial genome in early embryonic
cells can be transmitted to further generations. As this is the core
of the concept of germ-line modiﬁcation, there is no good reason
for not also applying the concept to germ-line modiﬁcations of
the mitochondrial genome.
Strictly speaking, nuclear transfer for mtDNA disorders leaves
the mitochondrial genome itself intact but produces a different
combination of nuclear DNA and mtDNA. Although it would
therefore be more precise to talk about ‘mtDNA replacement’
rather than ‘mtDNA modiﬁcation’, we nevertheless use the term
‘modiﬁcation’ as this is the term usually deployed in the
literature.
DOES MODIFICATION OF THE MTDNA AFFECT THE IDENTITY OF
THE FUTURE CHILD?
One of the most prominent (non-safety) objections against
germ-line modiﬁcation is the fear that it would become possible
to alter the presumed ‘essential characteristics’ of a future
person, thereby possibly violating the child’s right to an open
future. For this reason, germ-line modiﬁcation of the nuclear
DNA has led to more ethical controversy than modiﬁcation of
the mtDNA. The argument would be that the nuclear DNA
contains the ingredients for our characteristics, whereas the
mtDNA does not.14 15 In 2005, the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority (HFEA) granted researchers in the UK
a licence to determine preclinically the feasibility of a speciﬁc
type of nuclear transfer for mtDNA disorders, using the
pronuclei of the zygote. The HFEA explicitly started from the
premise that mtDNA is not associated with ‘identity or prede-
termined characteristics of the individual’.16 However, the
assumption that modiﬁcation of the mtDNA is ethically less
problematical than modiﬁcation of the nuclear DNA because it
would not involve the possibility of altering essential charac-
teristics is contestable for two reasons.
First, although the dominant view in science is that only the
nuclear DNA contains the ingredients for our characteristics, this
is not a fully settled issue. Usually, mtDNA is not considered
important for our individuality, also as thousands of people have
more or less identical mitochondria. The mtDNA would only
govern cellular energy production. However, different authors
have questioned the scientiﬁc assumption that the mtDNA is not
associated with essential characteristics. Some studies, although
not uncriticised, suggest associations between the mtDNA and
cognitive capabilities.17 18 Other authors have remarked that
mitochondria may have a signiﬁcant but unknown biological
function other than energy production.19 In fact, little is known
about the exact role and function of the mtDNA,20 and little is
known about the signiﬁcance of altering the match between
nuclear and mitochondrial complements.21e24 Although perhaps
hypothetical, the mtDNA may inﬂuence nuclear gene expression
and this, in turn, may inﬂuence the essential characteristics of the
resulting child.25 26
A second reason for criticising the assumption that modiﬁ-
cation of the mtDNA does not involve the possibility of altering
essential characteristics is that none of the key terms used to
make this distinction (such as ‘essential characteristics’ and
‘identity determining characteristics’) are ever precisely deﬁned.
The HFEA, for example, does not explicate how it understands
‘identity or predetermined characteristics of the individual’.
Although it is remarkable that key concepts are not deﬁned, this
should not come as a surprise, because what is it that separates
one person from another? and what exactly constitutes our
identity?
The relevant question here is whether germ-line modiﬁcation
leads to the birth of a different person.27 In the case of other
reproductive techniques, such as preimplantation genetic diag-
nosis, one chooses one embryo over another for implantation. If
one decides to transfer embryo A instead of embryo B, this
clearly leads to the birth of a different person. In the case of
germ-line modiﬁcation, this is less clear. The embryo is not
substituted but modiﬁed; does this affect the identity of the
person who is born?
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to create
a coherent account of identity, conceptual clarity may come
from Parﬁt.28 He discerns two types of identity (or ‘sameness’):
qualitative identity and numerical identity. Qualitative identity
means that two persons or two objects are exactly alike (Parﬁt
uses the example of two white billiard balls). Numerical identity
means that two persons or objects are one and the same. For
example, Barack Obama is numerically identical to the President
of the United States: they are one and the same person. Identical
twins may be qualitatively identical, meaning they are exactly
alike. Numerically, though, they are different: they are two
different persons. In some circumstances, it is meaningful to say
that a person has qualitatively changed, but not numerically. A
person who has had an accident may be qualitatively changed,
meaning that this person’s character has changeddwhen he
changes a lot, he becomes a different person in a qualitative
sense.29 Numerically though, it is the same persondonce we
exist, our numerical identity is quite robust through change.28 29
Similarly, germ-line modiﬁcation is likely to affect the quali-
tative identity of the future person, whereas his/her numerical
identity will be untouched. Ossorio27 convincingly explains why
germ-line modiﬁcation may actually change who is born
(although she does not discern these two types of identity). She
uses the speculative example of germ-line modiﬁcation for
LescheNyhan syndrome, an early-onset disease characterised by
mental retardation, self-mutilation and muscular and neurolog-
ical abnormalities. If one could replace the gene underlying
LescheNyhan syndrome in the early embryo, the person who
would be born would theoretically have a normal IQ, a normal
life expectancy, no muscular and neurological abnormalities et
cetera. Ossorio27 concludes that this person’s identity has been
changed, as it will have a different life experience and a different
character. We prefer to specify this conclusion by adding that
this person’s qualitative identity has been changed. Numerically,
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though, it remains one and the same embryodwhereas in
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, there is also a numerical
change as an embryo is replaced with another.
Similarly, it would be difﬁcult to maintain that a germ-line
modiﬁcation of the mitochondrial genome does not affect the
(qualitative) identity of the future person. Even if mtDNA only
has a basic cellular function, then it is still meaningful to say
that germ-line modiﬁcation of the mtDNA is likely to change
the (qualitative) identity of the future person. After all, a person
without a mtDNA disease will have a different life experience,
a different biography and perhaps also a different character. This
means that the dichotomy between modiﬁcation of the nuclear
DNA and modiﬁcation of the mtDNA is untenable from this
perspective; no matter whether one modiﬁes a (pathogenic)
nuclear gene or a (pathogenic) mitochondrial gene, the identity
of the future person will be changed. Therefore, modiﬁcation of
the mtDNA cannot be considered substantively different to
modiﬁcation of the nuclear DNA in terms of its effects on the
identity of the future person. The following step, then, is to
assess how this conclusion affects the moral evaluation of
nuclear transfer to prevent mtDNA disorders.
MODIFICATION OF THE MTDNA AND THE CHILD’S RIGHT TO AN
OPEN FUTURE
We have concluded that modiﬁcation of the mtDNA has iden-
tity-altering potential. The moot point, then, is whether such
a modiﬁcation could (still) be compatible with the position that
one should not violate the child’s right to an open future.
Although debate is possible about the interpretation of this
concept, taking it as a negative anticipatory autonomy right
would be the most relevant and appropriate in our discussion.
This means a right to have one’s future options kept open until
one is capable of making one’s own decisions. Habermas30 has
argued that genetic modiﬁcation may entail a prejudgement of
speciﬁc life projects, which may imperil autonomy. It threatens
the child being the author of its life, because others have already
framed it, or the child could have the feeling he/she is tailored
towards its parents’ expectations. In other words, by choosing
the genetic make-up of a child, its right to an open future is
violated. As we endorse the position that in a pluralist liberal
society one should allow people to be the authors of their lives,31
it would indeed be problematical when germ-line modiﬁcation
would restrict a child’s options in life, or when it would
predetermine a child towards speciﬁc life projects. It is therefore
important to assess whether germ-line modiﬁcation of the
mtDNA may indeed potentially threaten the child’s right to an
open future.
Despite the fact that a germ-line modiﬁcation of the mtDNA
is likely to alter the identity of the child, a clinical application of
nuclear transfer to prevent mtDNA could still be compatible
with the position that one should not violate the child’s right to
an open future. To prevent a child being predetermined towards
a speciﬁc plan of life, it seems reasonable only to allow modiﬁ-
cations that broadens so-called ‘general purpose means’.32 These
are capacities that are useful and valuable for carrying out nearly
all plans of life. In other words, we should only allow genetic
modiﬁcations of which we can assume that they give children
traits that are useful for all conceptions of a good life.31
Although debate is possible (and necessary) about what general
purpose means exactly are, being healthy should clearly be
included. Health, after all, is a sine qua non for many (although
not all) plans of life. Disabilities and disorders often (although
not always) mean that people have less good lives than they
would have had.33 It is reasonable to assume that a child with
a serious neurological or muscular disorder will experience the
disease (and the underlying mtDNA mutation) as a barrier for
many life plans. This is not to say that these children cannot
have satisfactory lives, but if germ-line modiﬁcation can safely
avoid the sometimes devastating effects of the mtDNA muta-
tion, it is reasonable to presume that the future child will have
more options in life. Also Habermas30 would probably allow this
application, as he allows germ-line modiﬁcation ‘for the goal of
avoiding evils that are unquestionably extreme and likely to be
rejected by all’.
To conclude, the mtDNA modiﬁcation is likely to alter the
identity of the child, but it does not necessarily limit the child’s
future options. On the contrary, the child may even have more
options in life. Whether the child’s improved health compen-
sates for the drastic intervention is an assessment that can only
be made case by case, depending on the likelihood of developing
disease symptoms, the expected seriousness of the disease and
the expected ‘costs’ in the trade-off (including the risks of the
intervention).
As we concluded earlier that modiﬁcation of the mtDNA is
not substantively different from modiﬁcation of the nuclear
DNA in terms of its effects on the identity of the future person,
any conclusion regarding the moral acceptability of modifying
the mtDNA applies mutatis mutandis to modiﬁcation of the
nuclear genome. This means that modiﬁcation of the nuclear
genome is equally acceptable as long as, other things being equal,
this does not violate the child’s right to an open future. More-
over, it would be interesting to explore whether and to what
extent the concept of general purpose means is useful in judging
the acceptability of germ-line modiﬁcation intended to enhance
human traits. Clearly, the right to an open future would only
serve as a necessary but not sufﬁcient criterion for assessing the
ethics of enhancement, as other relevant factors, such as safety
and justice issues, need to be taken into account as well. It
would also require further ﬁlling in which enhancements would
potentially count as future widening and which as future
narrowing.34
CONCLUSION
Germ-line modiﬁcation of the mtDNA is often considered less
controversial than modiﬁcation of the nuclear DNA, as the
presumption is that it is the nuclear DNA that contains the
ingredients for our characteristics. Modiﬁcation of the mtDNA
would not affect the identity of the future child, thereby not
carrying the possibility of violating the child’s right to an open
future. In this paper we have argued that even if the mtDNA
only has a basic cellular function then it is still meaningful to
say that a germ-line modiﬁcation of the mtDNA is likely to
change the (qualitative) identity of the future person. This
means that the dichotomy between modiﬁcation of the nuclear
DNA and modiﬁcation of the mtDNA is untenable from this
perspective; no matter whether one modiﬁes the nuclear genome
or the mitochondrial genome, the identity of the future child
will be changed. This is not to say that the distinction may not
be relevant from other perspectives. Modiﬁcation of the nuclear
DNA may for example be riskier, as it requires a disruption of
the nuclear membrane.14
We have argued that the moral acceptability of germ-line
modiﬁcation does not depend on whether it alters the identity of
the future childdall germ-line modiﬁcations dodbut on
whether it safeguards the child’s right to an open future. To
prevent that a child is predetermined towards a speciﬁc plan of
life, we should only allow germ-line modiﬁcation (of both the
nuclear and mtDNA) that broadens so-called ‘general purpose
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means’, which are capacities that are useful and valuable for
carrying out nearly all plans of life. As health is a sine qua non for
many plans in life, modiﬁcation of the mtDNA would establish
a more open future. It would therefore be an acceptable appli-
cation of germ-line modiﬁcation. Of course, the overall accept-
ability of using nuclear transfer for this purpose would also
depend on other relevant moral factors, such as the (intergen-
erational) safety and efﬁcacy of the procedure. As mitochondria
are transferred maternally, men will not pass on any mutant
mtDNA to their offspring. This may be a reason to consider only
creating male embryos, at least in the initial applications.35 In
addition, a further reﬂection on the role and position of the
oocyte donor is necessary. Nuclear transfer for mtDNA disorders
results in a child carrying the nuclear genome of its parents and
the mitochondrial genome from the oocyte donor. This invokes
still unaddressed conceptual and ethical questions regarding the
interpretation of (genetic) parenthood. Although there is an
array of ethical questions associated with nuclear transfer to
prevent mtDNA disorders that urgently needs ethical debate,
the fact that nuclear transfer with the aim of preventing the
transmission of mtDNA disease would involve germ-line modi-
ﬁcation cannot convincingly be construed as a categorical moral
objection against the possible use of this technology.
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